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ABSTRACT Massive expansion of wireless body area networks (WBANs) in the field of health monitoring
applications has given rise to the generation of huge amount of biomedical data. Ensuring privacy and
security of this very personal data serves as a major hurdle in the development of these systems. An
effective and energy friendly authentication algorithm is, therefore, a necessary requirement for current
WBANs. Conventional authentication algorithms are often implemented on higher levels of the Open System
Interconnectionmodel and require advanced software ormajor hardware upgradation. This paper investigates
the implementation of a physical layer security algorithm as an alternative. The algorithm is based on the
behavior fingerprint developed using the wireless channel characteristics. The usability of the algorithm is
established through experimental results, which show that this authentication method is not only effective,
but also very suitable for the energy-, resource-, and interface-limited WBAN medical applications.
INDEX TERMS Wireless body area networks, physical layer security, wireless channel characteristics,
authentication.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless body area networks (WBANs) have seen massive
level of growth in the recent past [1], [2]. Applications
of the WBANs range from communication to navigation,
survelience to sport monitoring and remote health care to
networking. It is envisaged that the market of global wearable
devices will see shipment of 187.2 million units annually
by 2020 [3]. Massive development of the WBANs is a result
of rigorous research on multiple aspects including antenna
design [4], [5], use of MIMO techniques [6], numerical mod-
eling of the human body [7], propagation mechanism [8]
and radio channel modeling [9]–[11]. The WBANs use a
number of technologies including Bluetooth, ZigBee, UWB
and terahertz for the wireless communications [12]. The
advancements in biomedical systems and signal processing
techniques have helped greatly to improve the health sector
significantly [13]. Continuous development of the healthcare
systems is taking them towards a future where prevention,
prediction, personalization and participation would be the
integral parts of any medical treatment [14]. Sustainability of
current healthcare systems depends on the efficient per-
formance of a number of wearable and implantable
wireless sensors. The nature of the applicability makes
miniaturization, low complexity and energy efficiency as
their prime requirements [3]. Wireless Body Area Net-
works (WBANs) are trying to meet these requirements
while providing economical real-time patient health mon-
itoring and reporting systems thanks to advancements in
microelectronics.
The WBAN sensors collect the Personal Health Informa-
tion (PHI) of a patient in the form of vital physiological
parameters such as pulse rate, heartbeat, blood pressure,
vision, electrocardiogram, diabetes, and oxygen level. The
PHI serves not only as an important reference in medical
diagnosis and treatment of the patient; it can also be used
as personal identification and health indicator in industry
services like insurance. Any theft and misuse of this infor-
mation can result in serious identity crisis and have fatal
consequences for the patient. Availability of high level of
security and privacy measures is therefore, pivotal to the
VOLUME 4, 2016
2169-3536 
 2016 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only.
Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
4789
N. Zhao et al.: Biometric Behavior Authentication
success of the WBAN systems due to very sensitive nature
of information they are dealing with [15]. Security flaws can
greatly hinder the popularity of the WBANs and affect their
development [16].
The WBANs are currently not considering security vul-
nerabilities fully as more focus is on reliabile deployment
of these systems [17]. Simple security methods available
are not very efficient and attackers can target the wear-
able/implantable sensors almost effortlessly to compromise
them on physical layer [18], [19]. Provision of a simple and
efficient authentication mechanism with minimum energy
consumption is therefore necessary for theWBAN healthcare
systems. In [20], the authors have proposed a light-weight
authentication scheme suitable for hierarchicalWBANs. This
scheme make use of the cryptographic hash function, and
symmetric key encryption/decryption algorithms. A new
user access control scheme for the WBANs employing a
group-based user access ID, an access privilege mask, and
a password is proposed in [21]. Ankaralıet al. have pre-
sented a physical layer authentication method for implantable
medical devices (IMDs), which does not need existing cryp-
tology [22]. Gollakota et al. have presented a physical layer
security model for the IMDs by delegating its security to a
personal base station. The base station acts as a jammer-cum-
receiver allowing it to jam the IMD’s messages, preventing
others from decoding them while being able to decode them
itself [23].
The physical layer security and authentication has attracted
attention of a number of researchers. Dautov et al. have
introduced compressed sensing for wireless physical layer
security encryption [24]. Shi has suggested that the pre-
shared key in ubiquitous WBAN sensors can be easily stolen
due to high demand and inexperienced users, so the node
authentication mechanism should have minimal dependency
on encryption [25]. This combined with low power consump-
tion requirement makes the traditional methods inappropriate
for the WBAN systems.
This paper presents a new physical layer authentication
technique based on the observation of the wireless channel
to recognize and form a fingerprint of the patient’s behavior.
This technique not only meets the essential criteria long
battery life, adaptability, and availability for a good security
authentication protocol [26] but also adds another degree
of security through personalization as the behavior of the
users in a specific scenario can vary significantly from each
other resulting in different wireless channel characteristics
and hence, different behavioural fingerprint. Implementation
of the authentication on the physical layer also removes high
overhead and processing time required for higher-layer secu-
rity techniques.
Following the introduction in this section, the rest of the
paper is structured into four sections. Section II discusses
the basics of the proposed algorithm. Section III describes
the experimental setup while Section IV presents the mea-
surement results and discussion on the performance of the
algorithm. Conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. SCENE DESCRIPTIONAND PRELIMINARY KNOWLEDGE
The structure of a generic healthcare system is illustrated in
Fig. 1.This simple scenario consists of three major parts; col-
lection of the PHI data via body-worn WBAN sensors, data
transfer and storage in the medical data cloud and delivery of
this data to relevant hospitals and medical staff like doctors
simultaneously for real-time monitoring and examination.
This work keeps its focus on the collection of the PHI in an
indoor environment like home or office (region marked as ‘a’
in Fig. 1), which is the most important part of this system
as overall performance depends on the efficient, and reliable
data collection.
FIGURE 1. Structure of a generic healthcare system.
To implement the proposed authentication algorithm using
patient’s behavioral fingerprint based on the physical char-
acteristics of the wireless channel, a three level security is
established. These three levels are termed as non-trust region,
limited trust region, and trust region and are shown in Fig.2.
FIGURE 2. The proposed three levels of security in a generic healthcare
system.
The non-trust region contains all open nodes in their initial
unauthenticated state. In the limited trust region, the nodes
undergo some basic security measures, but still vulnerable to
the security breaches and attacks. The nodes can enter to the
trust region only after extensive authentication process.
The authentication node (AN) serves as a communication
base station in the healthcare system and collects the informa-
tion provided by various wearable bio-sensors (WBs). The
AN is a fixed installation and equipped with basic security
measures, but still can suffer from security attacks. Therefore,
it is placed in limited-trust region. The WBs are being worn
by the patient and can be an easy target for the attackers. They
are, therefore, considered to be in the non - trust region.
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FIGURE 3. Authentication process and entry to trust region of AN and WB.
Fig. 3 depicts the states of WB and AN before and after the
authentication process. Initially without any authentication,
body-worn WB is in non-trust region (red) while AN is in
the limited-trust region (yellow). For the authentication, a
template is used based on the observation of the user’s behav-
ior. When the user’s behavior fingerprint is in accordance
with the template of the legal user, AN can enter the trust
region, marked as green. When theWB passes the user’s two-
way authentication, it can also enter the trust region, marked
as green also. When both the AN and WB have completed
the authentication process, a secure channel is established
between them and the two sides can start transmission and
reception of the PHI in the trust region.
To further enhance the security of the authentication mech-
anism and error mitigation, the behavioral fingerprint con-
siders user’s habits in four medical scenarios, including body
temperature measurement, washing gargle, taking medicine
and drip intake as given in Fig. 4.
FIGURE 4. Four scenarios considered for the behavioral fingerprint used
in the authentication process, (a) body temperature observation,
(b) washing gargle, (c) taking medicine, (d) drip intake.
The template is formed based on the characterization
of the wireless channel in these scenarios. To obtain
authentication, the user needs to behave normally in these
scenarios and match the behavioral fingerprint with the
template.
Our work is different from available results using upper
protocol. Ourwork is based on the physical layer communica-
tions, which is the bottom layer for WBANs. It is known that
there are three kinds of identity authentication: the knowl-
edge, the possession and the inherence. The knowledge-based
authentication may be forgotten, the authentication on the
basis of possession is easily attacked by the compromiser and
there are also some disadvantages for traditional biological
characteristics (e.g. For iris and fingerprint, although the
precision is high, they are changeless and can’t be cancelled).
Considering these factors, we use wearable nodes to explore
the body area channel characteristics. These characteristics
are seen as RF fingerprint; hence, the identity authentication
is achieved.
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETUPAND MEASUREMENTS
The usability of the proposed authentication technique is
established through wireless channel measurements in an
indoorWBAN environment. Measurements were taken in the
Communication Laboratory at Xidian University and in the
Xi’an Electronic and Science University hospital. The partic-
ipant has worn the WB on his right arm while the AN was
fixed on the nearby wall. The characteristics of the wireless
channel between the WB and AN for a normal behaving user
in the form of Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI)
have beenmeasured in the four scenarios of body temperature
observation, washing gargle, taking medicine and drip intake.
FIGURE 5. Communication protocol used in the proposed algorithm.
The proposed authentication method uses a communica-
tion protocol as shown in Fig. 5. At the start of the iden-
tity authentication, the sensor worn by the patient initiates
the communication with the AN by sending a ‘WB Hello’
message. This message awakens the AN and it replies with
the ‘AN Hello’ message. On reception of this message, the
WB sends the ‘WB Ping’ message that contains general non-
private information such as time alignment, routine detec-
tion, etc. The AN calculates the RSSI value from this and
subsequent ‘WB Ping’ messages to form a fingerprint of
the wireless channel for the user’s action. An RSSI value
sequence is then formed out of average of the noted values
to standardize the fingerprint. It is then compared to the
template for the authentication of the WB and to determine
its legitimacy.
In some extreme cases, the security of the AN can also be
compromised. This protocol also offers the certification of
the AN. The users can make deliberate actions during the
‘WB Ping’ message with non-private data transmittal that
would create significant variations in thewireless channel and
hence the fingerprint should not get a match with the template
resulting in provision of a failed authentication from the AN.
If an authentication is granted instead, it would clearly an
indication of a security breach at the AN end. Since, no
private health data is yet transmitted by the WB until this
point, the communication will be halted and the attacker will
get no useful information.
The behavioral template in the form of average standard-
ized value of the raw RSSI will be stored in the AN’s
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internal storage. The average standardization function is
given as:
RSSI (x) = ∣∣RSSI (x)raw∣∣ (1)
RSSI (x) =
∑36
1
RSSI (x)/36 (2)
ANBT (x) =
{
ANBT (x) = 1, RSSI (x) ≥ RSSI (x)
ANBT (x) = 0, RSSI (x) < RSSI (x) (3)
Theoretically, the raw RSSI value must be a negative num-
ber, for the convenience of calculations, the absolute value of
raw RSSI value is employed in (1). RSSI (x) represents the
average value of the RSSI sequence in (2). A sequence of 1s
and 0s is then formed using (3) where the position containing
RSSI (x) value greater than RSSI (x) is considered as 1, while
an alternative condition will get an assignment of 0. Thus, the
AN will contain no actual user data. Although, it will result
in loss of some bits of the user behavior fingerprint, but since
AN is located in the limited trust region, a sequence of 0s
and 1s would give no useful information to the attacker in the
event of a security compromise and will strengthen the safety.
For the RSSI measurements, an HBE-ubiquitous sensor
network module is used as the WB. The sensor node is being
worn by the user on his right arm. A PIFA antenna operat-
ing at 2.45 GHz is used in the sensor module for the data
reception/transmission and connectivity with the AN due to
its inherent features of good gain, large coverage, small size,
low specific absorption rate and resilience to human body
effects. The fabricated antenna prototype is shown in Fig. 6.
The antenna has an overall size of only 40 × 26 × 11 mm2,
and is connected to the wireless sensor module through an
SMA connector. The communication rate of all devices is set
at 2 packrts/s.
FIGURE 6. The PIFA antenna used in the measurements.
The measurements have been taken in the four scenarios
of body temperature measurement, washing gargle, taking
medicine and drip intake as given in Fig. 4. The user per-
forms these actions in a usual manner and the body-mounted
WB notes and transmits the observed values of the RSSI to
the AN. For example, in the first scenario, the user puts the
thermometer in his armpit for the temperature measurement.
FIGURE 7. Raw RSSI values, average standardized RSSI values and
1/0 sequence based on observation of the user measuring his
body temperature.
The sensor module observes the wireless channel and notes
down the RSSI values to establish the behavioral fingerprint.
It sends 36 information packets to theAN containing the RSSI
values where the sequence of 1s and 0s is made. Fig. 7 shows
the absolute raw RSSI values (Equation 1), average standard-
ized RSSI values (Equation 2) and standardized behavioral
fingerprint in the form of a sequence of 1s and 0s (Equation 3)
based on the measurements carried out in this scenario. In the
other three scenarios, the measurement process is similar but
with different actions.
IV. RESULT AND DISCUSSION
Table 1 presents the user’s behavioral fingerprint in the
form of 1/0 sequence based on the measurements done in
four scenarios.
TABLE 1. Average standardized data in the four considered scenarios.
Hamming Weight Variation (HWV), which typically gives
the number of 1’s in a string, is used as the initial condition
to filter the authentication data due to its small but very
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effective calculation. After the preliminary screening of the
data, Hamming Distance (HD), which is more accurate than
the HWV, is used for the resolution data. It is found in this
experiment that the HWV of 2 is a good and practical choice
to get the data differentiated, as given below:
ANBT [26]
HWV←→ Template[26]
×
{
≤ 2, Calculate HD
> 2, AuthenticationFail
(4)
ANBT [26]
HD←→ Template[26]
×
{
≤ 2, Authentication Pass
> 2, Authentication Fail
(5)
These equations require that the subject performs the four
considered actions in a usual habitual manner so that the
collected behavioral data HWV and HD have a value less
than 2 in order to get through the authentication.
To analyze the performance of the proposed authentication
algorithm, two types of attacks, namely passive attack and
active attack are considered. Adversary can eavesdrop on bio-
metric information, active attackers can even break through
physical boundaries to simulate the behavior of legitimate
users [27]. Figs. 8 and 9, depict the two scenarios of passive
attack where the eavesdropper Eve passively eavesdropping
Bob and Alice.
FIGURE 8. Passive eavesdropping on Bob.
The characteristics of both sides of the wireless communi-
cation channel are unique [28], [29]. A distance greater than
half wavelength can be considered as random, which can be
used as a source of random information. In this 2.45GHz
system, the distance is very small and it would be impossible
for the attacker to obtain the channel information unless he
is operating at an arm’s length distance that is the rarest
possibility. As a result, the eavesdropper Eve would be unable
to obtain the RSSI values and the resulting standardized
sequenced data. This makes the proposed authentication tech-
nique very safe against the passive attacks.
FIGURE 9. Passive eavesdropping on Alice.
FIGURE 10. Active attack on Alice.
Figs. 10-12 illustrate three possible scenarios of active
attacks on the WBAN system.
In Fig. 10, active attacker Mallory, who is pretending to be
Bob, initiates an attack on Alice, to get a fake certification.
Mallory however, is unable to know the right behavioral
fingerprint of Alice and hence, will not be certified.
In Fig. 11, Mallory is now acting as Alice and wishes to
gain access to Bob’s personal data by deception. However,
Bob will get more than one ‘AN Hello’ responses in this
scenario and Mallory’s attempt will be uncovered.
A third possibility of the active attack given in Fig. 12
where Mallory uses technical means such as directional
antennas to block Alice. In this scenario, Mallory, who is the
actual attacker, communicates with Bob (who is legitimate
user) in the disguise of Alice. By the AN authentication in
the proposed protocol, the attack from Mallory can be found.
In addition, since Bob is not static and the authentication time
is very short, it is very difficult to carry out shield attack.The
efficiency of the proposed technique is evident in these active
attack scenarios.
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FIGURE 11. Active attack on Bob.
FIGURE 12. Active attack on Bob when Alice is blocked.
Multiple such attack tests were carried out in order to estab-
lish the success rate of the proposed authentication protocol.
Table 2 provides a summary of the attack tests in the consid-
ered passive and active attack scenarios and performance of
the proposed authentication method.
The test was carried out to verify the usability of the proto-
col. The results are good due to the fact that the subjects have
more experience than the user do. As preliminary screening,
HWV did not show good anti-attack performance, since we
are only testing the usability of the protocol. In Table 2, for
the four scenarios, all the legitimate users satisfy condition (4)
and HD condition (5). After a lot of tests, it is found that the
false rejection rate is very low for experienced subjects. False
acceptance rate is also very low, both for the experienced and
inexperienced subjects. This indicates the commendable and
concise usability of the screening process [26], [30].
We also test the passive attack from Eva. Fig. 8-9 presents
two modes of attack. Since the distance between spatial
distribution of RSSI sequence and Eva is larger than half
TABLE 2. Attack test results for proposed authentication protocol in
different passive and active attack scenarios.
wavelength, they are statistically independent. Eva will only
get meaningless random sequence (Table 2) and will not have
more knowledge for successful attack.
In the authentication process, the attack from Mallory is
extremely dangerous. In this work, we only consider the
authentication, the active attack in the communications is out
of the scope of the paper.
Fig. 10-12 gives the active attack mode, the anti-attack
performance of the protocol is also tested for these three envi-
ronment. In Table 2(a), since the attacker does not know the
behavior fingerprint of the legitimate user, all the attack will
fail. In scenario (b), Mallory pretends to be Alice; however,
Bob will receive conflict package, the attack would be found.
In scenario (c), as there is authentication for Alice, the attack
will fail as well. It shows the feasibility of this method to deal
with the attack pattern proposed in [23].
All the legitimate users pass the initial screening of HWV
and HD. However, subsequent authentication mechanisms
bring-in stronger checks and attackers do not get the certi-
fication in case of passive and active attack scenarios, in line
with the discussion presented earlier in this section. It further
affirms the usefulness of the proposed technique.
These results also confirm that this method generates
almost no additional packages during the authentication pro-
cess as compared to upper-layer authentication protocols such
as key-based methods. It also brings huge amount of energy
saving as no dedicated authentication packets are required.
It makes this method very suitable candidate for medical
sensor application environment where battery life is a key
element of concern.
V. CONCLUSION
A novel authentication method is implemented on the physi-
cal layer based on the observation of user’s behavioral fin-
gerprint using wireless channel characterization has been
presented. The efficiency of the proposed technique has
been analyzed through experimental measurements in real-
istic WBAN scenarios. Different passive and active attack
scenarios have been discussed.
The presented results have shown that the proposed tech-
nique provides a higher degree of safety to the WBAN users
and safeguard them from most of the security breaches and
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increases level of reliability and availability. This method
does not require hardware upgrades as long as awireless com-
munication channel is established between the body-mounted
sensors and access nodes making it highly adaptable. More-
over, the proposed algorithm employs normal communication
to achieve identity authentication with minimal additional
package transmission. It makes it highly energy efficient,
resulting in a prolonged battery life of the WBAN sensors.
These advantages make this protocol a very well suited
authentication method for the WBAN applications.
Further research would be carried out to extend the inves-
tigation and optimize the performance of the algorithm by
considering different antennas and measuring actual power
consumption levels.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to thank the reviewers and the
Associate Editor for providing constructive and generous
feedback.
REFERENCES
[1] D. B. Smith and D. Miniutti, ‘‘Cooperative selection combining in body
area networks: Switching rates in gamma fading,’’ IEEEWireless Commun.
Lett., vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 284–287, Aug. 2012.
[2] N. Chahat, C. Leduc,M. Zhadobov, andR. Sauleau, ‘‘Antennas and interac-
tion with the body for body-centric wireless communications at millimeter-
waves,’’ in Proc. 7th EUCAP, 2013, pp. 772–775.
[3] Q. H. Abbasi, M. Ur Rehman, K. Qaraqe, and A. Alomainy, ‘‘Advances in
body-centric wireless communication: Applications and state-of-the-art,’’
IET, Jul. 2016.
[4] H. T. Chattha, M. Nasir, Q. H. Abbasi, Y. Huang, and S. S. AlJa’afreh,
‘‘Compact low-profile dual-port single wideband planar inverted-FMIMO
antenna,’’ IEEE Antenna Wireless Propag. Lett., vol. 12, pp. 1673–1675,
Jan. 2014.
[5] M. Ur-Rehman, Q. H. Abbasi, M. Akram, and C. Parini, ‘‘Design of
band-notched ultra wideband antenna for indoor and wearable wire-
less communications,’’ IET Microw., Antennas Propag., vol. 9, no. 3,
pp. 243–251, 2015.
[6] M. Qaraqe, Q. H. Abbasi, A. Alomainy, and E. Serpedin, ‘‘Experimental
evaluation of MIMO capacity for ultrawideband body-centric wireless
propagation channels,’’ IEEE Antenna Wireless Propag. Lett., vol. 13,
pp. 495–498, Mar. 2014.
[7] M. Ur-Rehman, Q. H. Abbasi, X. Chen, and Z. Ying, ‘‘Numerical mod-
elling of human body for Bluetooth body-worn applications,’’ Prog.
Electromagn. Res., vol. 143, pp. 623–639, Dec. 2013.
[8] M. Ur Rehman et al., ‘‘Investigation of on-body Bluetooth transmission,’’
IET Microw., Antennas Propag., vol. 4, no. 7, pp. 871–880, Jul. 2010.
[9] Q. H. Abbasi, A. Sani, A. Alomainy, and Y. Hao, ‘‘Experimental char-
acterization and statistical analysis of the pseudo-dynamic ultrawideband
on-body radio channel,’’ IEEE Antenna Wireless Propag. Lett., vol. 10,
pp. 748–751, Aug. 2011.
[10] Q. H. Abbasi, A. Sani, A. Alomainy, and Y. Hao, ‘‘Numerical charac-
terization and modeling of subject-specific ultrawideband body-centric
radio channels and systems for healthcare applications,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf.
Technol. Biomed., vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 221–227, Mar. 2012.
[11] M. M. Khan, Q. H. Abbasi, A. Alomainy, Y. Hao, and C. Parini, ‘‘Exper-
imental characterisation of ultra-wideband off-body radio channels con-
sidering antenna effects,’’ IET Microw., Antennas Propag., vol. 7, no. 5,
pp. 370–380, Apr. 2013.
[12] H. Q. Abbasi, H. El Sallabi, N. Chopra, K. Yang, K. A. Qaraqe, and
A. Alomainy, ‘‘Terahertz channel characterization inside the human skin
for nano-scale body-centric networks,’’ IEEE Trans. THz Sci. Technol.,
vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 427–434, May 2016.
[13] S. Venugopalan, M. Savvides, M. O. Griofa, and K. Cohen, ‘‘Analysis
of low-dimensional radio-frequency impedance-based cardio-synchronous
waveforms for biometric authentication,’’ IEEE Trans. Biomed. Eng.,
vol. 61, no. 8, pp. 2324–2335, Aug. 2014.
[14] J. Andreu-Perez, D. R. Leff, H. M. D. Ip, and G. Z. Yang, ‘‘From
wearable sensors to smart implants—Toward pervasive and personalized
healthcare,’’ IEEE Trans. Biomed. Eng., vol. 62, no. 12, pp. 2750–2762,
Dec. 2015.
[15] D. He, S. Chan, Y. Zhang, and H. Yang, ‘‘Lightweight and confi-
dential data discovery and dissemination for wireless body area net-
works,’’ IEEE J. Biomed. Health Inform., vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 440–448,
Mar. 2014.
[16] V. Mainanwal, M. Gupta, and S. K. Upadhayay, ‘‘A survey on wire-
less body area network: Security technology and its design methodology
issue,’’ in Proc. Int. Conf. Innov. Inf., Embedded Commun. Syst. (ICIIECS)
Coimbatore, India, 2015, pp. 1–5.
[17] R. Cavallari, F. Martelli, R. Rosini, C. Buratti, and R. Verdone,
‘‘A survey on wireless body area networks: Technologies and
design challenges,’’ IEEE Commun. Surveys Tuts., vol. 16, no. 3,
pp. 1635–1657, 3rd Quart., 2014.
[18] K. Malasri and L. Wang, ‘‘Securing wireless implantable devices for
healthcare: Ideas and challenges,’’ IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 47, no. 7,
pp. 74–80, Jul. 2009.
[19] D. He, C. Chen, S. Chan, J. Bu, and P. Zhang, ‘‘Secure and lightweight
network admission and transmission protocol for body sensor networks,’’
IEEE J. Biomed. Health Inform., vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 664–674, May 2013.
[20] A. K. Das, S. Chatterjee, and J. K. Sing, ‘‘A new biometric-based remote
user authentication scheme in hierarchical wireless body area sensor net-
works,’’ Ad Hoc Sensor Wireless Netw., vol. 28, nos. 3–4, pp. 221–256,
2015.
[21] S. Chatterjee, A. K. Das, and J. K. Sing, ‘‘A novel and efficient user access
control scheme for wireless body area sensor networks,’’ J. King Saud
Univ.-Comput. Inf. Sci., vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 181–201, 2014.
[22] Z. E. Ankaralı et al., ‘‘Physical layer security for wireless implantable
medical devices,’’ in Proc. IEEE Int. Workshop Comput. Aided Modelling
Design Commun. Links Netw. (CAMAD), Guildford, U.K., Sep. 2015,
pp. 144–147.
[23] S. Gollakota, H. Hassanieh, B. Ransford, D. Katabi, and K. Fu, ‘‘They
can hear your heartbeats: Non-invasive security for implantable medical
devices,’’ SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev., vol. 41, no. 4, pp. 2–13,
Aug. 2011.
[24] R. Dautov and G. R. Tsouri, ‘‘Securing while sampling in wireless body
area networks with application to electrocardiography,’’ IEEE J. Biomed.
Health Inform., vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 135–142, Jan. 2016.
[25] L. Shi, M. Li, S. Yu, and J. Yuan, ‘‘BANA: Body area network authenti-
cation exploiting channel characteristics,’’ IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun.,
vol. 31, no. 9, pp. 1803–1816, Sep. 2013.
[26] Z. E. Ankaralı, Q. H. Abbasi, A. F. Demir, E. Serpedin, K. Qaraqe, and
H. Arslan, ‘‘A comparative review on the wireless implantable medi-
cal devices privacy and security,’’ in Proc. EAI 4th Int. Conf. Wireless
Mobile Communication Healthcare (Mobihealth), Athens, Greece, 2014,
pp. 246–249.
[27] K. Simoens, J. Bringer, H. Chabanne, and S. Seys, ‘‘A framework for ana-
lyzing template security and privacy in biometric authentication systems,’’
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 833–841, Apr. 2012.
[28] J. E. Hershey, A. A. Hassan, and R. Yarlagadda, ‘‘Unconventional cryp-
tographic keying variable management,’’ IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 43,
no. 1, pp. 3–6, Jan. 1995.
[29] S. T. Ali, V. Sivaraman, and D. Ostry, ‘‘Eliminating reconciliation cost
in secret key generation for body-worn health monitoring devices,’’ IEEE
Trans. Mobile Comput., vol. 13, no. 12, pp. 2763–2776, Dec. 2014.
[30] V. Odelu, A. K. Das, and A. Goswami, ‘‘A secure biometrics-based
multi-server authentication protocol using smart cards,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf.
Forensics Security, vol. 10, no. 9, pp. 1953–1966, Sep. 2015.
NAN ZHAO, photograph and biography not available at the time of
publication.
AIFENG REN, photograph and biography not available at the time of
publication.
VOLUME 4, 2016 4795
N. Zhao et al.: Biometric Behavior Authentication
MASOOD UR REHMAN (SM’16) received the B.Sc. degree in electronics
and telecommunication engineering from the University of Engineering and
Technology, Lahore, Pakistan, in 2004, and the M.Sc. and Ph.D. degrees in
electronic engineering from the Queen Mary University of London, London,
U.K., in 2006 and 2010, respectively. He joined the Centre for Wireless
Research, University of Bedfordshire, University Square, Luton, U.K., as
a Lecturer. He was with the Queen Mary University of London as a Post-
Doctoral Research Assistant till 2012. His research interests include com-
pact antenna design, radiowave propagation and channel characterization,
satellite navigation system antennas in cluttered environment, antenna inter-
action with human body, body-centric wireless networks and sensors, remote
health care technology, mmWave and nano communications for body-centric
networks, and body-to-body communications. He has involved in a number
of projects supported by industrial partners and research councils. He has
contributed to a patent and authored or co-authored two books, five book
chapters and over 50 technical articles in leading journals and peer-reviewed
conferences. Dr. Rehman is a fellow of the Higher Education Academy,
U.K., a member of the IET and part of the technical program committees
and organizing committees of several international conferences, workshops,
and special sessions. He also serves as a Reviewer for book publishers, the
IEEE conferences, and leading journals.
ZHIYA ZHANG, photograph and biography not available at the time of
publication.
XIAODONG YANG, photograph and biography not available at the time of
publication.
FANGMING HU, photograph and biography not available at the time of
publication.
4796 VOLUME 4, 2016
